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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) has made tremendous
progress during the past decade and ML models have been
deployed in many real world applications. However, recent
research has shown that ML models are vulnerable to attacks
against their underlying training data. One major attack in this
field is membership inference the goal of which is to determine
whether a data sample is part of the training set of a target
machine learning model. So far, most of the membership inference
attacks against ML classifiers leverage the posteriors returned by
the target model as their input. However, empirical results show
that these attacks can be easily mitigated if the target model only
returns the predicted label instead of posteriors.
In this paper, we perform a systematic investigation of
membership inference attack when the target model only provides
the predicted label. We name our attack label-only membership
inference attack. We focus on two adversarial settings and propose
different attacks, namely transfer-based attack and perturbation
based attack. The transfer-based attack follows the intuition
that if a locally established shadow model is similar enough to
the target model, then the adversary can leverage the shadow
model’s information to predict a target sample’s membership.
The perturbation-based attack relies on adversarial perturbation
techniques to modify the target sample to a different class, and
uses the magnitude of the perturbation to judge whether it is a
member or not. This is based on the intuition that a member
sample is harder to be perturbed to a different class than a non-
member sample. Extensive experiments over 6 different datasets
demonstrate that both of our attacks achieve strong performance.
This further demonstrates the severity of membership privacy
risks of machine learning models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, machine learning (ML) has witnessed
tremendous progress, enabling a wide range of applications,
such as image recognition and machine translation. However,
various recent research has shown that machine learning mod-
els are vulnerable to attacks against their training data [11],
[14], [18]–[20], [24], [33], [37], [43], [44], [46], [48]. One
major attack in this field is the membership inference attack
which aims to determine whether a data sample is used to train
a target ML model or not. Successful membership inference
attacks can lead to severe consequences. For instance, if a ma-
chine learning model is trained on data collected from patients
with a certain disease, then knowing a victim belonging to the
training set immediately leaks the health status of the victim.
All the current membership inference attacks leverage the
overfitting nature of ML models. Specifically, an ML model is
more confident facing a data sample it was trained on, and this
confidence is reflected on the model’s output, i.e, posteriors in
the ML classification setting. Therefore, they use the posteriors
of the target sample returned by the target model as their attack
models’ input. We refer to these attacks as posterior-based
membership inference attacks.
A major drawback for the current posterior-based attacks
is that they can be trivially mitigated [32], [46], [48], [57]:
The model can simply return the predicted label instead of
posteriors. The fact that posterior-based attacks can be easily
averted makes it more difficult to evaluate whether a model is
truly vulnerable to membership inference or not, which may
lead to premature claims about the model’s privacy risks.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we study membership inference attack against
machine learning models when the target model only provides
the predicted label of the target sample instead of posteriors.
We name our attack label-only membership inference attack.
Specifically, we study two different scenarios for label-
only membership inference and propose two attacks, namely
transfer-based membership inference attack and perturbation-
based membership inference attack. For both of our attacks,
we consider an adversary with only black-box access to
the target model. This means that the adversary can only
query the model with a set of data samples and obtain the
corresponding predicted labels, i.e., the most difficult setting
for the adversary [48]. In the following, we abstractly introduce
each of our attacks.
Transfer-based Membership Inference Attack. For the
transfer-based membership inference attack, we assume that
the adversary has a shadow dataset that comes from the same
distribution as the target model’s training set. However, the
adversary does not know the ground truth labels for samples
in the shadow dataset. We first use the target model as an oracle
to label samples in the shadow dataset. In this way, we hope the
labelled shadow dataset can contain enough information from
the target model. Then, we use the shadow dataset to construct
a shadow model to mimic the target model. In the end, we
rely on the shadow model to perform our attack following the
intuition that if the shadow model is similar enough to the
target model, then a target sample being predicted confidently
by the shadow model indicates it is a member of the target
model’s training set.
Extensive experimental evaluation (we use a set of mod-
els with different overfitting levels under multiple types of
datasets) shows that the adversary can achieve excellent mem-
bership inference performance. For instance, we achieve an
AUC (area under the ROC curve) of 0.8749 when the target
model is trained with the CIFAR-10 dataset [1].
Perturbation-based Membership Inference Attack. For this
adversary, we consider a more difficult and realistic scenario
in which no shadow dataset is available to the adversary. To
compensate for the lack of information in this setting, we
shift our focus from the model’s output to the input. Here,
our intuition is that it is harder to perturb a member sample
to a different class than a non-member sample relying on
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TABLE I: An overview of the different types of membership inference attacks. “X” means the adversary needs the information
and “-” indicates the information is not necessary.
Attack category Attacks Target model’s Target model’s Detailed model prediction Predicted labelstructure training data distribution (e.g. probabilities or logits)
Posterior-based [32], [46], [48], [57] Xor - Xor - X X
Label-only Transfer-based - X - XPerturbation-based - - - X
adversarial example techniques. Following this intuition, the
adversary use the magnitude of the perturbation to differentiate
member and non-member samples.
Experimental evaluations show that the perturbation-based
attack has excellent performance on multiple datasets, and in
some cases is even better than the transfer-based attack. For
instance, our attack achieves an AUC of 0.7988 on the MNIST
dataset [2], and an AUC of 0.9216 on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
We further conduct experiments to prove the feasibility of this
method and reveal the reasons behind the attack’s success.
Our results show that membership inference can be ef-
fectively mounted when the target model only provides the
predicted label. This further sheds light on the severe privacy
risks caused by membership inference attacks against ML
models.
In general, our contributions can be summarized as the
following:
• We perform a systematic investigation on label-only
membership inference attack against machine learn-
ing models, which is highly relevant for real-world
applications and important to gauge model privacy.
• We introduce two label-only membership inference
attacks under two different attack scenarios, including
transfer-based attack and perturbation-based attack.
• Extensive experiments on a wide range of datasets
demonstrate the severe membership privacy risks
stemming from machine learning models.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as the following.
Section II introduces the definition of membership inference
against ML models, target models, and datasets used in the
paper. Section III and Section IV present the threat models,
attack methodologies, and evaluations of our two types of
attacks, respectively. In Section V, we discuss the limitations of
the current work and possible extensions. Section VI presents
the related work and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first define the membership inference
attack in the machine learning setting, second, describe the
datasets used, and third, introduce the target model used for
our evaluation.
A. Membership Inference Against Machine Learning Models
In this paper, we concentrate on machine learning classi-
fication, the most common ML application. An ML classifier
M aims to map a data sample x ∈ X ⊂ Rd to a class label
y ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Here, K represents the total number of
labels. For most of the classification models, the output vector
M(x) can be interpreted as a set of posterior probabilities
over all classes, and the sum of all the values is 1. We also
refer to this vector as posteriors. To learn an ML classifier, one
needs a labelled dataset and performs optimization following
a predefined loss function.
Membership inference attack in the ML setting emerges
when an adversary aims to find out whether her target data
sample is used to train a certain ML model. More formally,
given a data sample x, a trained machine learning model M,
and external knowledge of an adversary, denoted by Ω, a
membership inference attack (attack model) can be defined
as the following function.
A : x,M,Ω→ {0, 1}
Here, 0 means x is not a member of M’s training dataset
DTrain and 1 otherwise. The machine learning model M that
the adversary targets is also referred to as the target model.
The attack model A is essentially a binary classifier. De-
pending on the assumptions, it can be constructed in different
ways, which will be presented in later sections.
B. Datasets Description
We utilize 6 different benchmark image datasets, includ-
ing MNIST [2], FashionMNIST [3], CIFAR-10 [1], CIFAR-
100 [1], GTSRB [4], and Face [5], to conduct our experiments.
For each dataset, we split it by half into DTarget and DShadow :
One is used to train the target model, while the other is used
to train the shadow model for our transfer-based attack. As
images in GTSRB are different size, we resize them to 64×64
pixels. For the Face dataset, we only consider people with
more than 40 images, which leaves us with 19 peoples data,
i.e., 19 classes.
C. Target Model Description
Generally, we use convolutional neural network (CNN)
for image classification tasks, which is also the network
architecture adopted by previous works [34], [35], [46], [48].
For MNIST and FashionMNIST, since they are only 28x28
grayscale images, our CNN is assembled with 2 convolutional
layers and 2 pooling layers with 1 hidden layer containing 784
units in the end. For the other datasets, we use 10 convolutional
layers and 5 pooling layers with 2 hidden layers containing 256
units each in the end.
2
TABLE II: Target model M with different overfitting levels
on each dataset. We split each dataset to training and testing
set with different fractions.
Target Target Dataset
Model MNIST FMNIST CIFAR10 CIFAR100 GTSRB Face
M-0 0.09 0.17 0.36 0.65 0.26 0.14
M-1 0.12 0.18 0.40 0.68 0.39 0.20
M-2 0.15 0.22 0.44 0.73 0.46 0.27
M-3 0.17 0.24 0.50 0.77 0.55 0.35
M-4 0.29 0.29 0.58 0.80 0.67 0.43
M-5 0.38 0.41 0.63 0.83 0.76 0.55
It is well known that overfitting drives classifiers to be
vulnerable to membership inference attacks [46], [48]. To show
the variation of the attack performance on each dataset, we
build models with different overfitting levels. In particular, we
train the target model using dataset of different size (detailed
in the Appendix). And, we quantify the overfitting level of a
target model as the difference between its prediction accuracy
on the training set and testing set. All the target models with
different overfitting levels on each dataset are summarized in
Table II.
III. TRANSFER-BASED MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACK
In this section, we present the first attack, i.e., transfer-
based membership inference. We start by introducing the threat
model. Then, we describe the attack methodology. In the end,
we present the evaluation results.
A. Threat Model
As presented in Table I, the adversary only has black-box
access to the target model, i.e., she is not able to extract
the target sample’s membership status from the posteriors.
Therefore, the adversary trains a shadow model S to imitate
the behavior of the target model M, and then relies on the
shadow model to mount the attack.
To train the shadow model, we assume that the adversary
has a unlabelled shadow dataset, denoted by XShadow that
comes from the same underlying distribution as the target
model’s training set DTarget . This is a weaker assumption com-
pared to previous works [46], [48] and renders the adversary
more flexibility.
B. Key Intuition
Our intuition for this attack can be described as the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the shadow model S and the target model
M are similar enough, then a data sample’s membership status
in the target model can be reflected in the shadow model.
Following this intuition, we hypothesize that if the target
sample receives a confident prediction on the shadow model,
then it is likely to be a member in the target model’s training
set. To quantify the prediction confidence of the target sample
on the shadow model S, we focus on its loss with respect to S.
Besides, we also consider the maximal posterior and posterior
entropy. Note that the target sample is never used to train the
shadow model.
C. Methodology
The adversarys methodology can be divided into four
stages, including shadow dataset labeling, shadow model
structure selection, shadow model training, and membership
inference.
Shadow Dataset Labeling. As mentioned before, the adver-
sary has a shadow dataset XShadow without labels. To train a
shadow model, the first step is to label these samples using
the target model M as an oracle. In this way, she establish a
connection between the shadow dataset and the target model,
which facilitates the shadow model to be more similar to the
target model.
Shadow Model Structure Selection. Since the adversary
knows the main task of the target model, she simply use
a similar type of neural network as her shadow model. For
instance, if the target model is a convolutional neural network
(CNN), then she uses a CNN as well. We emphasize that the
adversary does not have the knowledge of the concrete archi-
tecture of the target model, this is another relaxed assumption
compared to previous works [46], [48]. In Section III-D, we
show that a wide range of architecture choices yield similar
attack performance.
Shadow Model Training. The adversary trains the shadow
model S with the dataset and model determined in the previous
two steps.
Membership Inference. Finally, the adversary feeds the
target sample into the shadow model S to calculate its cross-
entropy loss. If the loss value is smaller than a threshold,
we predict the target sample being a member and vice versa.
Here, the loss value is calculate by the ground truth label
of the target sample. The adversary can pick her threshold
depending on her requirements, as in many machine learning
applications [46]. In our evaluation, we mainly use area under
the ROC curve (AUC) which is threshold independent as our
evaluation metric.
D. Evaluation
Experimental Setup. We evaluate our attack over all datasets.
For each dataset, we first split it by half into DTarget and
XShadow .1 Following the attack strategy, DTarget is also split
by two: One is used to train the target model M, i.e.,
DTrain , and serves as the member samples of the target model,
while the other DTest serves as the non-member samples. As
mentioned in Section II, for each dataset, we repeat the split
6 times with different training set proportions and then train 6
target models with different overfitting levels, denoted by M-
0, M-1, . . .M-5 (see Table II). XShadow , on the other hand,
is first labelled by the target model, then is used to train the
shadow model.
We execute the evaluation on randomly reshuffled data
samples from DTarget , and use sets of the same size (i.e,
equal number of members and non-members) to maximize
the uncertainty of inference, thus the baseline performance
1We discard the labels for XShadow .
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Fig. 1: Comparison of our transfer-based attack performance with the attack by Salem et al. across all target models. The x-axis
represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the AUC score.
is equivalent to random guessing. Note that most of the
experiments by Shokri et al. [48] and Salem et al. [46] use
the same setup.
We also compare our attack against the attack of Salem
et al. [46]. Following the original configuration of the authors
code,2 we train one shadow model using half of XShadow with
its ground truth labels, and one attack model in a supervised
manner based on the shadow model’s posteriors.
We adopt AUC as our evaluation metric which measures
the area under the ROC curve. ROC reflects the relation
between false positive rate and true positive rate over a set of
thresholds, thus AUC is threshold independent. Many recent
works have adopted AUC to measure privacy as well [8], [19],
[22], [27], [41], [46]. In addition, we further discuss methods
to pick threshold for our attacks in Section V.
Results. Figure 1 depicts the performance of the transfer-
based attack. We observe that our attack performs relatively
worse on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Face than the attack of
Salem et al. [46], which is expected as their attack utilizes
the posterior as the input. However, on the other 3 datasets,
their attack achieves a relatively weaker performance, and even
the attack performance drops with the increase of overfitting
level on the GTSRB dataset (see Figure 1e). This is still due
to the inherent overfitting nature of ML models, in this case
the attack model. In the work by Salem et al. [46], the shadow
2https://github.com/AhmedSalem2/ML-Leaks
model is trained using the ground truth labels from the shadow
dataset rather than the target model’s outputs, which indicates
the training process is independent of the target model. Further,
this also shows that the closer the overfitting level between
the shadow model and the target model, the more similar
the posterior distribution between them, then a more effective
attack model can be achieved.3 However, the adversary cannot
determine the precise overfitting level of the target model in
real-world applications, which lead to a huge uncertainty of
the attack performance, as shown in Figure 1c, Figure 1d, and
Figure 1e.
We further investigate the effect of the shadow dataset size
and shadow model complexity (structure and hyper-parameter)
on the attack performance. More concretely, we vary the size of
the shadow dataset XShadow from 1,920 to 19,200, where the
target training set DTrain is 9,600. We also vary the complexity
of the shadow model from 3.85M (number of parameters) and
40.15M (FLOPs, computational complexity) to 24.91M and
446.85M, where the target model complexity is 9.56M and
229.54M, respectively. We conduct an extensive experiment
to tune these two hyperparameters simultaneously and report
the results in Figure 3. Through investigation, we make the
following observations.
• Larger shadow dataset implies more queries to the
target model which leads to better attack performance.
3We confirm this with the authors.
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Fig. 2: Attack AUC for three different statistical measures over all datasets and target models. The x-axis represents the target
model being attacked and the y-axis represents the AUC score.
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Fig. 3: Attack AUC under the effect of changing the dataset
size and shadow model complexity (upper is the number of
parameters, lower is the computational complexity FLOPs).
The target model (M-2, CIFAR-10)’s training set size is 9600,
and complexity is 229.54M parameters and 9.56M FLOPs.
• Higher similarity between the shadow model and the
target model leads to better attack performance.
• Even simpler shadow models (one-third of the parame-
ters, one-fifth of the computational complexity, or less)
can achieve strong attack performance.
In addition, we experiment with other statistical metrics,
including the maximal posterior and entropy, for our attack.
Figure 2 shows AUC on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-
100 datasets, the results for other datasets can be found in
the Appendix. We can observe that loss achieves the highest
performance with respect to different overfitting levels. Mean-
while, the AUC score is almost the same for maximal posterior
and entropy. This indicates the loss value contains the strongest
signal on differentiating member and non-member samples.
Figure 4 further shows the loss distribution of member and
non-member samples from the target model calculated on the
shadow model (M-0 andM-5 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
results for other datasets are listed in the Appendix). Though
both member and non-member samples are never used to train
the shadow model, we still observe a clear difference between
their loss. This verifies our Proposition 1 in Section III-B: If
the shadow model and the target model are similar enough,
a member sample from the target model can also receive a
confident prediction by the shadow model.
IV. PERTURBATION-BASED MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE
ATTACK
After demonstrating the effectiveness of our transfer-based
membership inference attack, we now present our second
attack, i.e., perturbation-based membership inference. We start
with the threat model description. Then, we introduce the
attack methodology. In the end, we present the evaluation
results.
A. Threat Model
Compared to the transfer-based attack, our perturbation-
based attack has minimal assumption. This indicates the adver-
sary does not have a shadow dataset to train a shadow model.
All she could rely on is the predicted label for the target sample
from the target model. To the best of our knowledge, this is
by far the most strict setting for membership inference against
machine learning classifiers.
B. Key Intuition
Our intuition behind this attack follows a general obser-
vation of the overfitting nature of ML models. Specifically,
an ML model is more confident in predicting samples that
it is trained on. In contrast to the previous posterior-based
attacks [46], [48] that directly use posteriors as inputs, we
place our focus on the antithesis of this observation, i.e., since
the ML model is more confident on member data samples, it
should be much harder to change its mind.
Figure 5 depicts the posteriors for two randomly selected
member data samples (Figure 5a, Figure 5c) and non-member
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Fig. 4: The cross entropy loss distribution obtained from the shadow model. The x-axis represents the loss value and the y-axis
represents the number of the loss.
TABLE III: The cross entropy between the target model’s output posterior and other labels except for the predicted label. ACE
represent the average cross entropy.
Ground Truth Predicted Cross Entorpy
Status Label Label 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ACE
(a) Member 6 6 7.8156 8.3803 4.1979 1.0942 4.1367 4.3492 - 7.6328 1.5522 1.2923 4.4946
(b) Non-member 8 8 2.3274 0.8761 0.8239 2.0793 1.2275 0.9791 1.2373 1.1152 - 5.0451 1.2218
(c) Member 3 3 1.2995 5.2842 5.4212 - 1.5130 4.8059 4.5897 7.1547 3.2411 4.7910 4.2334
(d) Non-member 7 9 2.8686 1.8325 3.6480 0.5352 1.8722 1.1689 4.0124 0.6866 3.1071 - 2.1766
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Fig. 5: The posterior probability distribution of the target
model (M-0, CIFAR-10) on two member data samples and
two non-member data samples.
data samples (Figure 5b, Figure 5d) with respect to M-
0 trained on CIFAR-10. We can observe that the maximal
posterior for member samples is indeed much higher than the
one of non-member samples. We further use cross entropy, a
common metric for classification task, to quantify the difficulty
for an ML model to change its predicted label for a data sample
to other labels.
CE = −
K∑
i=0
Yi log(Mi(x))
Here, Yi ∈ {0, 1} is i-th class vector of the one-hot encoding
label except for the predicted label and K is the number of
classes (see Section II). Table III shows the cross entropy
between posteriors and other labels for these two member and
two non-member samples. We can see that member samples
cross entropy is significantly larger than non-member samples.
These observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given an ML model and a set of data samples,
the cost for changing member samples’ predicted labels is
larger than that for non-member samples.
Furthermore, consider an ML model which only provides
predicted labels instead of posteriors, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. When using adversarial perturbation to change
predicted labels of an ML model for a set of data samples, the
noise added to member samples is larger than that to non-
member samples.
Following this proposition, we propose to use the magni-
tude of the perturbation on a sample to determine whether the
sample is a member or not.
C. Methodology
Our attack methodology consists of the following three
stages, i.e., perturbation generation, noise measurement, and
membership inference.
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Fig. 6: L2 distance between the original sample and its perturbed samples generated by the Boundary attack. The x-axis represents
the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the L2 distance.
Perturbation Generation. The goal of changing the predicted
label is similar to that of adversarial examples [9], [12], [39],
[40], [47], [51], thus we use the same technique to modify
the input to mislead the target model. As the adversary only
has black-box access to the target ML model, we adopt un-
targeted black-box adversarial attacks, such as Boundary [10],
SaltAndPepperNoise [6], and AdditiveUniformNoise [6] in our
attack.
Noise Measurement. Once the perturbation has finished, we
measure the magnitude of the noise added to the target sample.
In general, adversarial attacks typically use Lp distance (or
Minkowski Distance), e.g., L0, L1, L2, and L∞, to measure
the perceptual similarity between a perturbed sample and its
original one. Thus, the adversary can also use Lp distance to
measure the noise.
Membership Inference. After obtaining the magnitude of
the noise, the adversary simply considers a sample with noise
larger than a threshold as a member sample, and vice versa.
Similar to the transfer-based attack, we mainly use AUC as
our evaluation metric. We also provide a general and simple
method for choosing a threshold in Section V.
D. Evaluation
Experiment Setup. We use the same experiment setup as pre-
sented in Section III, such as the dataset splitting strategy and
training 6 target models with different overfitting levels. We
perform our attack over all datasets. For evaluation metric, we
again adopt AUC. Regarding perturbation generation, we use
the source code provided by Foolbox [6]. For space reasons,
we report the results of Boundary and SaltAndPepperNoise in
the main body of the paper. Results by AdditiveUniformNoise
can be found in the Appendix.
Results. First, we show the distribution of noise between a
perturbed sample and its original one for member and non-
member samples in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Both Boundary
and SaltAndPepperNoise attacks apply L2 distance to limit the
magnitude of perturbation, thus we report results of L2 dis-
tance as well. As expected, the magnitude of the perturbation
on member samples is indeed larger than that on non-member
samples. For instance in Figure 6 (M-5, CIFAR-10), the
average L2 distance of the perturbation for member samples
is 1.2282, while that for non-member samples is 0.6624.
In addition, models with lower overfitting level require less
perturbation. As the overfitting level increases, the adversary
needs to modify more on the given sample. The reason is that
an ML model with a higher overfitting level has remembered
its training samples to a larger extent, thus it is much harder
to change their predicted labels, i.e., larger perturbation is
required.
We report the AUC values over all dataset in Figure 8
and Figure 9. We compare 4 different distance metrics, i.e.,
L0, L1, L2, and L∞, for each perturbation scheme. For the
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Fig. 7: L2 distance between the original sample and its perturbed samples generated by the SaltAndPepperNoise attack. The
x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the L2 distance.
Boundary attack in Figure 8, we can observe that L1 distance
and L2 distance achieve the best performance followed by L∞
distance across all datasets. L0 distance performs the worst.
For instance, on the CIFAR-10 dataset with M-5, the AUC
scores for L1 distance, L2 distance, and L∞ distance are
0.9188, 0.9216, and 0.9164, respectively, while the AUC score
for L0 distance is 0.6132. It is worth noting that other metrics,
including L1 and L∞, can also achieve similar performance for
the Boundary attack. In contrast, for the SaltAndPepperNoise
attack in Figure 9, the AUC score of the L0 distance achieves
the best performance, followed by the L1 distance and L2
distance. This provides the adversary with some guidelines on
how to choose perturbation generation approaches and distance
measurement metrics.
All the above results have sufficiently demonstrated the
efficacy of our proposed perturbation-based attack. Next, we
take a deeper look on why this attack works.
First, we study the decision boundary of the target model
(CIFAR-10, M-4) with a given set of data samples, including
800 member samples and 800 non-member samples. To better
visualize the decision boundary, there are two points to note:
• The adversary can only rely on the predicted label,
so it is difficult to gain insight from the original
input space which is connected with the ground truth
label. Thus we visualize the decision boundary of
the transformed space, i.e., the output space of the
last hidden layer which is fully connected with the
predicted label space.
• Due to the limitations of the target dataset size, we fur-
ther sample a large number of random samples across
the output space so that we can fill the whole space,
which can clearly visualize the decision boundary that
distinguishes between different predicted labels.
To this end, we map the given data samples into the trans-
formed space and embed the output posteriors into a 2D space
using t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE).
Figure 10a shows the results for 10 classes of CIFAR-10. We
can see that the given data samples have been clearly classified
into 10 classes and mapped to 10 different regions. For the sake
of analysis, we purposely zoom in three different regions in the
upper left of the whole space. As we can see in Figure 10b, the
member samples and non-member samples belonging to the
same predicted label are tightly divided into 2 clusters, which
explains why the previous posterior-based attack can achieve
effective performance. More interestingly, we can see that the
member samples are further away from the decision boundary
than the non-member samples, that is, the distance between
the members and the decision boundary is larger than that of
the non-members. Again, this validates our key intuition.
Recall that in the first stage, we apply black-box adversarial
attacks for perturbation generation. Here, we give an intuitive
overview of how the Boundary attack and SaltAndPepperNoise
attack work in Figure 10c. As we can see, though these
two attacks adopt different strategies to find the perturbed
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Fig. 8: Attack AUC for four different Lp distances to measure the distance between the original samples and its perturbed
samples generated by the Boundary attack. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the
AUC score.
sample, there is one thing in common: The search ends at
the tangent points between the neighboring Lp-radius ball of
the original sample and its decision boundary. Only in this
way they can mislead the target model and also generate a
small perturbation. Combined with Figure 10b, we can find
that the magnitude of perturbation is essentially a reflection of
the distance from the original sample to its decision boundary.
Quantitatively, in the following, we verify whether the distance
from member samples to its decision boundary is larger than
non-member samples.
E. Certified Radius
We investigate the relationship between the membership
status of samples and their neighboring Lp-radius ball in
a classification task. This neighboring Lp-radius ball, which
reflects the magnitude of perturbation, is also called the Robust
Radius. It is defined as the Lp robustness of the target model
at a data sample and it represents the radius of the largest
Lp ball centered at the data sample in which the target model
does not change its prediction, as shown in Figure 10c. In
this work, we investigate the L2 robustness of the target
model M at a data sample x. As previous work [55] shows
that computing the L2 robust radius of a model is NP-hard,
similar to Zhai et al. [58], we also derive a tight lower
bound of Robust Radius, namely Certified Radius, which
satisfies 0 ≤ CR(M;x, y) ≤ R(M;x, y) for any M, x and
corresponding label y ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Note that, we use fM
represents the target model’s predicted label in the following,
where M(x) represents the target model’s posteriors.
Randomized Smoothing. In this work, we apply a recent
technique, called randomized smoothing [17], which is scal-
able to any architectures, to obtain the certified radius of
smoothed deep neural networks. The key part of randomized
smoothing is to use the smoothed version of M, which is
denoted by G, to make predictions. The formulation of G is
defined as follows.
Definition 1. For an arbitrary classifier M and σ > 0, the
smoothed classifier G of M is defined as
fG(x) = arg max
c∈Y
Pε∼N (0,σ2I)(fM(x+ ε) = c) (1)
In short, the smoothed classifier G returns the label most likely
to be returned byM when its input is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution N (x, σ2I) centered at x. Cohen et al. [17] prove
the following theorem, which provides an analytic form of
certified radius:
Theorem 1. [17] Let fM : x → y, and ε ∼ N (0, σ2I).
Let the smoothed classifier G be defined as in (1). Let the
ground truth of an input x be its prediction y. If G classifies
x correctly, i.e.,
Pε(fM(x+ ε) = y) ≥ max
y′ 6=y
Pε(fM(x+ ε) = y′) (2)
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Fig. 9: Attack AUC for four different Lp distances to measure the distance between the original sample and its perturbed samples
generated by the SaltAndPepperNoise attack. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the
AUC score.
Then G is provably robust at x, with the certified radius given
by
CR(fG ;x, y) =
σ
2
[Φ−1(Pε(fM(x+ ε) = y))
− Φ−1(max
y′ 6=y
Pε(fM(x+ ε) = y′))]
=
σ
2
[Φ−1(Eε1{fM(x+ε)=y})
− Φ−1(max
y′ 6=y
Eε1{fM(x+ε)=y′})] (3)
where Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard Gaussian distribution.
ACR of Members and Non-members. For the target model
M and each data sample (x, fM(x)), we can estimate the
certified radius CR(M;x, fM(x)). Here, we use the average
certified radius (ACR) as a metric.
We report the results on target models with different over-
fitting levels over all datasets. From the results summarized
in Table IV, we can draw the following conclusions.
• The ACR of member samples is universally greater
than the ACR of non-member samples, which forms
the basis for the success of our perturbation-based
attack.
• The difference between the ACR of member samples
and non-member samples also increases with the in-
creasing overfitting level, which exactly reflects the
increasing attack performance in the aforementioned
AUC results.
The key to the success of our perturbation-based attack is
the difference between member’s CR and non-member’s CR,
and this difference can be exactly reflected in the adversarial
perturbation against the robustness. Note that almost all certi-
fied radius is to certify the robustness of an ML model, in this
paper, we are the first to use it to certify the privacy of an ML
model. We believe that this leaves an interesting direction for
future research into robustness and privacy in classification.
V. DISCUSSIONS
Comparison of Different Attacks. Figure 11 compares the
performance of the attack by Salem et al. [48] and our
2 attacks. In particular, we show the best performance for
our second attack by adopting the Boundary method for
perturbation generation. As we can see, our perturbation-
based attack achieves the best performance for most of the
datasets except for GTSRB. As our perturbation-based attack
exploits the least information, i.e., predicted labels, to mount
the attack, this demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed label-
only membership inference attack, thereby the corresponding
membership privacy risks stemming from ML models are
much more severe than previously shown.
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TABLE IV: Average certified radius (ACR) of members and non-members across all target models and datasets.
MNIST FashionMNIST CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 GTSRB Face
Target Model Member Non-mem Member Non-mem Member Non-mem Member Non-mem Member Non-mem Member Non-mem
M-0 0.8704 0.7780 0.4605 0.3826 0.1636 0.1633 0.0292 0.0198 0.4667 0.3232 0.0638 0.0614
M-1 0.8876 0.8001 0.5115 0.3861 0.2166 0.1203 0.0447 0.0318 0.4648 0.2815 0.2172 0.1332
M-2 0.8943 0.7047 0.5497 0.4142 0.2245 0.1459 0.0401 0.0082 0.4274 0.2391 0.1708 0.1494
M-3 0.8982 0.6866 0.5783 0.4347 0.3573 0.2029 0.1086 0.0304 0.4497 0.1936 0.1306 0.1475
M-4 0.9215 0.6146 0.6283 0.3816 0.4191 0.1980 0.1695 0.0281 0.4659 0.1973 0.3049 0.3382
M-5 0.9143 0.5175 0.7350 0.3312 0.5167 0.3239 0.2876 0.0599 0.4262 0.2245 0.2668 0.4287
Threshold Choosing. As mentioned before, in the membership
inference stage for both of our attacks, the adversary needs to
make a manual decision on what threshold to use. For the
transfer-based attack, since we assume that the adversary has
a dataset that comes from the same distribution as the target
models training set, she can rely on the shadow dataset to
estimate a threshold by sampling certain part of that dataset
as non-member samples.
Here, we mainly focus on our perturbation-based attack
where the adversary is not equipped with a shadow dataset.
We provide a simple and general method for choosing a
threshold. Concretely, we generate a set of random samples in
the feature space as the target model’s training set. In the case
of image classification, we sample each pixel for an image
from a uniform distribution. Next, we treat these randomly
generated samples as non-members and query them to the
target model. Then, we add adversarial perturbations on these
random samples to change their initial predicted labels by the
target model. In the end, we use these samples’ magnitude of
perturbation to estimate a threshold, i.e., finding a suitable top
t percentile over these perturbation.
We experimentally generate 100 random samples for M-
5 trained with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively, and
adopt the Boundary attack for perturbation generation. We
again use the L2 distance to measure the magnitude of per-
turbation and F1 score as our evaluation metric. Figure 12
shows the results over different t. As we can see, setting t
from 5 to 40 achieves a good performance for both cases. In
addition, even the worse performance when t=90 is still quite
good (0.7092 for CIFAR-10 and 0.6803 for CIFAR-100). Thus,
we conclude that our threshold-choosing method can achieve
good performance.
Query Limitation. To mount our perturbation-based attacks
in the real-world ML application, such as Machine Learning
as a Service (MLaaS), the adversary cannot issue as many
queries as she wants, since a large number of queries increases
the cost of the attack and may cause suspicion of the model
provider. We now evaluate the attack performance with dif-
ferent number of queries. Here, we also adopt the Boundary
attack for perturbation generation on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 datasets. We vary the number of queries from 0 to 20,000,
and evaluate the attack performance based on the L2 distance.
As we can see in Figure 13, the AUC increases sharply with
the increase of the number of queries in the beginning. For
instance, when querying 10 times, the AUC for CIFAR-10
is 0.6928 and CIFAR-100 is 0.8060. At this time, though
the perturbed sample is far away from its origin’s decision
boundary, the magnitude of perturbation for member samples is
still relatively larger than that for non-member samples. After
3,000 queries, the attack performance becomes stable. In the
future, we plan to investigate means to reduce the number of
queries.
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Fig. 11: Comparison of our transfer-based and perturbed-based performance with the attack by Salem et al. across all target
models. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represents the AUC score.
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VI. RELATED WORKS
Membership Inference Against Machine Learning. Mem-
bership inference attack has been successfully performed in
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Fig. 13: Attack AUC under the effect of number of queries.
The x-axis represents the number of queries and the y-axis
represents the AUC score for perturbation-based attack.
various data domains, ranging form biomedical data [7], [22],
[26] to mobility traces [41]. Shokri et al. [48] present the first
membership inference attack against machine learning models.
The general idea behind is to use multiple shadow models to
generate data to train multiple attacks models (one for each
class). These attack models take the target sample’s posteriors
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as input. Salem et al. [46] later present another attack by
gradually relaxing the assumptions made by Shokri et al. [48]
achieving a model and data independent membership infer-
ence. Yeom et al. [57] quantitatively analyze the relationship
between the attacks and the loss over both training set and
testing set and propose a general attack. Long et al. [32]
proposes an indirect attack by analyzing the distribution of the
perturbed sample’s posteriors. Besides classifiers, others have
performed membership inference attacks against other types
of ML models [13], [23], [29], [33], [35], [49].
As pointed out before, all these attacks are posterior-
based. In this work, we study label-only membership inference
attack. Prior to this, multiple works have performed initial
investigation on label-only membership inference [25], [42],
[57]. We also acknowledge that there is a concurrent work
which proposes a similar approach as our perturbation-based
attack [16]. Besides, we further introduce a novel transfer-
based attack in this paper.
Multiple defense mechanisms have been proposed to mit-
igate membership privacy risks. As overfitting is the major
reason for membership inference to be successful, several
approaches have been proposed with the aim of reducing
overfitting [34], [46], [48]. Recently, Jia et al. [27] introduce
MemGuard, the first defense with formal utility-loss guarantees
against black-box membership inference attacks. The basic
idea behind this work is to add carefully crafted noise to pos-
teriors of an ML model to mislead the membership classifier.
Yang et al. [56] also propose a similar defense in this direction.
One common utility requirement adopted by these methods is
that the predicted label for a sample cannot be changed. This
however indicates that they cannot be used to mitigate our
label-only attack.
Other Attacks Against Machine Learning. In recent years,
there are many other attacks against ML models [38]. One
major attack in the field is adversarial examples [9], [12],
[39], [40], [47], [51], we leverage its technique to establish our
perturbation-based attack. Meanwhile, backdoor attacks have
received a lot of attention [15], [21], [30], [31], [45], [50], [54].
Ganju et al. [20] propose a property inference attack aiming
at to infer general properties of the target model’s training set,
such as training samples’ gender distribution. Salem et al. [44]
study the problem of dataset reconstruction in the online
learning setting by proposing a novel generative adversarial
network model. Trame`r et al. [52] present the first attack on
stealing an ML classifier’s parameters. Recently, Krishna et
al. [28] extend the model stealing attack to natural language
processing models. Besides model parameters, other works
focus on stealing the target model’s hyperparameters [36],
[53].
VII. CONCLUSION
During the past decade, machine learning has made rapid
progress. Nowadays, ML models have been deployed in var-
ious real-world applications, such as image recognition and
machine translation. However, recent research shows that ML
models are vulnerable to various attacks against its training
set [11], [14], [18]–[20], [24], [33], [37], [43], [44], [46], [48].
One major attack in this field is membership inference where
the adversary aims to determine whether a data sample is part
of the target ML model’s training set.
The current membership inference attacks mainly leverage
the overfitting behavior of an ML model. That is an ML
model is more confident in its prediction for a training/member
sample, and this confidence is reflected on the model’s output,
i.e., posteriors. Therefore, all the current attacks leverage
posteriors as inputs to achieve effective performance. However,
these attacks can be trivially mitigated if the target model only
returns the predicted label instead of posteriors.
In this paper, we systematically investigate label-only
membership inference attack to examine whether a predicted
label alone can leak the corresponding target sample’s mem-
bership status. We propose two attacks tailored for two threat
models, namely transfer-based attack and perturbation-based
attack. For the transfer-based attack, we assume the adversary
has a shadow dataset (without labels) that comes from the same
distribution as the target model’s training set. Then, she uses
the target model as an oracle to label her shadow dataset and
trains a shadow model based on it. In the end, to mount the
attack, the adversary calculates the prediction confidence of
the target sample with respect to the shadow model and make
her prediction with the confidence. Our transfer-based attack
follows the intuition that if the shadow model and the target
model are similar enough, then a member sample of the target
model should also receives confident prediction by the shadow
model.
For the perturbation-based attack, the adversary is not
equipped with a shadow dataset. In this case, the attack’s
intuition is that it is harder to perturb a member sample to
a different class than a non-member sample. To this end,
the adversary utilizes the technique of adversarial example to
add perturbation to the target sample and judges the sample’s
membership status based on the magnitude of the perturbation.
We have performed extensive experiments over a set of
6 datasets. Evaluation results show that both of our attacks
achieve effective performance. Our work demonstrates the
severity of membership privacy risks stemming from machine
learning models, and we believe it can serve as a stepping stone
for more advanced attacks and effective defense mechanisms
in the future.
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Fig. 14: Attack AUC for three different statistical measures. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis
represents the AUC score.
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Fig. 15: The cross entropy loss distribution obtained from the shadow model. The x-axis represent the loss value and the y-axis
represent the number of the loss.
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Fig. 16: L∞ distance between the orginal samples and the corresponding perturbed samples generated by the AdditiveUniform-
Noise attack. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the y-axis represent the L∞ distance
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Fig. 17: Attack AUC for four different Lp distances to measure the distance between the original samples and the corresponding
perturbed samples generated by the AdditiveUniformNoise attack. The x-axis represents the target model being attacked and the
y-axis represent the AUC score.
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